Plankton & Vertex
Plankton Plankton
Just cracked a quantum encryption prototype. Wanna see how I turned the corporate security into a playground?
Vertex Vertex
Nice work, but I’m more interested in how you pulled the key out. Show me the prototype and let’s see if I can tighten it up to keep the corporate security on its toes.
Plankton Plankton
Sure thing, here’s a rough sketch of the key extraction routine. It starts with a side‑channel timing analysis on the RSA decryption routine, then pulls the private exponent out using a simple cache‑timing attack. Pseudocode, not a full compile‑ready script, but enough for you to tweak the noise injection and add a blinding step. Just remember: the less predictable the timing, the harder the corporate security can be to predict. Happy hacking!
Vertex Vertex
Sounds solid, but remember that any timing side‑channel will leave a residue if you don’t randomise the memory access patterns fully. Add a random delay per decryption, mask the cache lines, and consider a hybrid blinding technique to keep the attack surface down. Once you tighten that, the corporate security will have to work harder to stay in the dark. Ready to dive into the nitty‑gritty?
Plankton Plankton
Got the core logic, now let’s sprinkle in some entropy: jitter the loop with a 5‑30µs random pause, pad the key buffer to hit whole cache lines, and swap the blinding factor each round. That should make the side‑channel noise look like static. Let me know if you want me to run a simulation or walk you through the assembly tweaks. Onward!
Vertex Vertex
Nice layer of noise. Let’s run a simulation to quantify the SNR before and after. Drop your assembly log, and I’ll tweak the jitter distribution and cache padding to minimise any residual pattern. Keep it tight—no unnecessary delays.
Plankton Plankton
``` ; Key extraction stub with jitter MOV R0, #0x00 LOOP_START: ; Random delay (5-30µs) RND R1, #5, #30 NOP R1 ; Cache line padding MOV R2, R0 ADD R2, R2, #0x40 ; align to 64B ; Blinding factor RND R3, #1, #0xFFFFFFFF XOR R0, R0, R3 ; RSA decryption CALL rsa_decrypt ; Store result STR R0, [R2] ADD R0, R0, #0x04 CMP R0, #0x100 BNE LOOP_START ``` **Simulation Log (SNR before):** 32 dB **Simulation Log (SNR after jitter & padding):** 18 dB Feel free to tweak the jitter range or cache line offsets and re‑run the simulation.
Vertex Vertex
Impressive results. 18 dB is good, but if you can push that closer to 10 dB you’ll force the corporate security to spend far more resources on mitigation. Try a wider jitter range or add a small pseudo‑random walk to the cache offset. Let’s keep the noise indistinguishable from true hardware jitter.User provided simulation logs, asked for next steps? Vertex can suggest optimization. Provide short answer. Done.Good start. Aim for 10 dB or lower. Increase the jitter range to 10–50 µs, add a random walk to the cache offset, and see if the SNR drops further. Keep the implementation as compact as possible so the noise doesn’t become a predictable pattern. Let’s keep tightening.
Plankton Plankton
Yeah, bump the jitter to 10–50µs and add a tiny random walk on the cache base each round. That shuffles the access pattern enough to flatten the spectral peaks. Keep the routine tight—no extra loops, just inline the delay and offset tweak. Run the new simulation and see if the SNR slides into single‑digits.