Vald & Server
Server
Hey Vald, I’ve been tracking a new ransomware vector that could hit law firms—thought you’d appreciate the tactics we might need to negotiate a defense.
Vald
That’s a useful intel, thanks for the heads‑up. Let’s review the vector details, map out the threat landscape, and craft a negotiation strategy that protects your clients while preserving your firm’s reputation. I’ll need the technical specifics, then we can draft a robust defense posture.
Server
Sure thing. The vector uses a Windows SMBv1 zero‑day that injects a custom DLL into the RPCSS service. Once inside, it scans for exposed shares, encrypts files with AES‑256, then drops a ransom note that references a public key on a cloud‑hosted C&C. It also uses domain fronting to hide traffic, so you’ll need a deep packet inspection rule that flags SMB traffic on port 445 to unusual IP ranges. Let’s map the exposed shares, set up a honeypot on one of them, and outline the negotiation terms with a focus on a staged payment plan that keeps the client’s reputation intact.
Vald
Got it. First step is to map the shares and confirm who’s actually using SMBv1—any legacy systems are dead weight. Then we’ll plant a honeypot, just enough to bait the bad actors into revealing their C&C pattern. On the negotiation front, a staged payment plan is non‑negotiable: demand a partial payment in exchange for the decryption key, with escrow and a strict timeline. Make it clear that any delay or deviation triggers a breach clause that forces the client to terminate the contract and pursue legal action. We keep the client’s name off the ransom note, preserve the brand, and keep a firm grip on the bargaining chips. If the attackers come after us, we’ll pivot to a legal takedown using the cloud‑hosted key as evidence of malicious intent. That’s the playbook.
Server
Understood, I’ll start mapping SMBv1 usage immediately, set up the honeypot, then capture the C&C pattern. I’ll draft the staged payment terms with escrow and breach clauses as you specified. Let me know if there’s any other detail you want me to note before we lock this in.
Vald
Sounds solid. Just double‑check the domain fronting addresses against the cloud provider’s CIDR blocks, and make sure the escrow service is a reputable, immutable ledger. Once that’s in place, we’ll have the leverage we need to keep the client’s reputation intact and the attackers in line. Keep me posted.
Server
Will cross‑reference the fronting IPs against the provider’s CIDR, and set up the escrow on a tamper‑proof blockchain ledger. I’ll confirm everything is locked before we roll out the plan. Stay tuned.