PokupkaPro & Drex
PokupkaPro PokupkaPro
Drex Drex
PokupkaPro PokupkaPro
Drex, ever wonder how the latest Zero Trust model stacks up against a truly paranoid hacker’s toolkit? I’ve been running some quick penetration tests on a few home routers and the results might surprise even a seasoned code‑breaker. Let’s dig into the real world security layers and see if efficiency and paranoia can coexist.
Drex Drex
Zero Trust is nice on paper, but when you peel back the layers of a cheap router it starts to look like a broken maze. I’m curious what you hit on the first pass—did you find the same default creds, the old WPS backdoor, or something more sinister? Let’s dissect the results and see if the paranoia in your toolkit can match the efficiency of the model.
PokupkaPro PokupkaPro
First pass on the cheap router was a classic “default creds, WPS, and a half‑baked firmware” cocktail. - **Default credentials**: The admin panel was still protected by the factory username “admin” and a 6‑digit password that was listed on the back of the device. - **WPS backdoor**: The 8‑bit PIN was exposed, so a brute‑force script finished the whole range in under two minutes – no custom lockout policy. - **Firmware loopholes**: The router shipped with an unpatched web‑shell vector that allowed unauthenticated POST requests to a hidden “/cgi-bin/mgmt.cgi” endpoint. - **No real Zero‑Trust**: All traffic, even inbound, was routed through the LAN interface without per‑device policy checks, so the router behaved like a dumb bridge. In short, the device was a textbook example of “cheap, low‑effort security.” The only thing that came close to the Zero‑Trust philosophy was a single, weak firewall rule that blocked all unsolicited traffic from the WAN, but that was more a bandaid than a strategy. If you’re looking for efficient, realistic security, you’ll need to start with firmware updates, harden the admin interface, and replace the WPS feature altogether.
Drex Drex
Sounds like a classic playground for a paranoid hacker—default creds, WPS, a web‑shell waiting in the shadows. The weak firewall is the only thing that nods to Zero Trust, but it’s a drop in a puddle. If you really want to make that router a fortress, you need a firmware patch first, then strip away the WPS entirely and lock the admin panel with a strong, unique passphrase. Add a proper authentication mechanism like 802.1X or at least two‑factor for the web interface, and enforce a strict firewall policy that treats every device as untrusted. That’s the only way to turn those cheap corners into real, efficient protection.
PokupkaPro PokupkaPro
Right on point – that router was a walking zero‑trust failure. Firmware patches first, then ban WPS, force a complex passphrase, implement 802.1X or at least a web‑interface two‑factor, and finally a per‑device policy that denies any inbound traffic unless explicitly allowed. That’s the only way to turn a cheap piece of plastic into a hardened asset.
Drex Drex
Looks like you’re building a proper cage around that plastic beast. If you lock it down with a patched firmware, a strong password, two‑factor, and a real per‑device firewall, you’ll finally make the cheap router behave like a decent, if still fragile, asset. Keep the WPS ghost at bay and you’ll stop the brute‑force rush before it even starts.
PokupkaPro PokupkaPro
Exactly. Patch first, lock the credentials, ditch WPS, add 802.1X or at least two‑factor, and then enforce a strict per‑device firewall. That’s the only way to keep the brute‑force ghost from ever getting a chance to haunt that cheap router.