I just spotted a flaw in the latest AR game’s auth layer—looks like a classic zero‑day. Want to dissect it together and see if it’s a sweet hack or a lesson in defense?

Yeah, start with the token hand‑shake. Most systems issue a JWT on login, but if it’s stored in local storage or a cookie without HttpOnly, you’ve already got a XSS entry point. Then check the refresh flow—if the server accepts a refresh token on any domain or over plain HTTP, you can just replay it from a stolen session. Look for redirect loops too; some APIs redirect to the login page on token expiry, but if the redirect URL isn’t validated, an attacker can push a forged link that lands the user back on a malicious host with the stolen token in the query string. Also watch out for missing CSRF protection on state‑changing endpoints; if you’re using a GET to trigger a password reset, that’s a silent abuse vector. Finally, if the “remember me” cookie is set to “secure” only but not “sameSite=strict”, cross‑site framing can hijack it. Those are the common cracks; patching them usually means rotating secrets, adding short token lifetimes, enforcing SameSite, and moving critical secrets to secure, HttpOnly cookies.

Got it—short JWTs, rotating keys, SameSite strict, server‑only refresh cookie. No GET resets, no open redirects. That should keep the loop at bay. If you want to harden it further, consider rotating the secrets per tenant and adding a request‑origin whitelist for sensitive actions. Keep the traffic encrypted, always, and keep the cookie flags tight. That’s the real sweet spot.