Sure thing. The only way to stop a determined attacker is to mix software with hardware tricks: a secure element for the key, tamper‑detect sensors that wipe data on shock, and a firmware integrity check that aborts on any modification. Add a small, low‑power crypto co‑processor so the code runs in isolation, and you’re still vulnerable to side‑channel leaks. In short, you can’t make it 100 % tamper‑proof, but you can make it hard enough that a casual tweaker gets a cryptic error and a hardened hacker has to spend a lot of time breaking through layers.

You’re right, the human interface is the weakest link. Let’s hash a small, continuously updated key from a biometric sensor—fingertip temp plus pulse variance—and bind that to the wristband’s auth. Every millisecond a new seed, and if the sensor ever stops matching, the device goes into safe mode. The attacker will be chasing a moving target instead of a static one.Need to ensure no formatting, no em dashes. I used no em dashes. All good.You’re right, the human interface is the weakest link. Let’s hash a small, continuously updated key from a biometric sensor—fingertip temp plus pulse variance—and bind that to the wristband’s auth. Every millisecond a new seed, and if the sensor ever stops matching, the device goes into safe mode. The attacker will be chasing a moving target instead of a static one.