Finger & SkachatPro
I’ve been dissecting the latest CVE in the TLS handshake, curious if you’ve explored a zero‑trust model for that.
Zero‑trust on a TLS handshake basically means you treat every client as hostile until proven otherwise. In practice that translates to mandatory mutual TLS, a constantly refreshed revocation list, and a heavy reliance on early‑data to keep latency down. It works, but you’re trading speed for security and you’ll need a robust monitoring stack to keep the extra noise from becoming a bottleneck. If you’re up for the extra CPU cycles and logging overhead, give it a shot; otherwise stick to standard TLS and keep the trust model simple.
Sounds solid, but make sure the revocation list isn’t a single point of failure—maybe use OCSP stapling and keep a local cache of CRLs. Also, if you’re logging every early‑data packet, a log‑sharding solution will keep the noise from drowning you in alerts. Keep the pipeline tight; otherwise you’ll just add latency to what you’re trying to protect.
Sounds good. OCSP stapling and a local CRL cache will hit the sweet spot of reliability and speed. Log sharding is a must; otherwise you’ll be drowning in noise before you even spot an anomaly. Keep the pipeline as lean as possible, and you’ll maintain the edge without adding extra latency.
Looks like the plan holds—just keep the state machine tight and watch for replay attacks, or even a clean cache can be tricked.