I’ve skimmed the specs and the hype is understandable, but I’d still flag a few concerns before I’d recommend it. The tamper‑proof claim is usually a marketing term; real proof requires a third‑party penetration audit. The end‑to‑end encryption is good, but we need to know the cipher suite, key rotation policy, and whether the keys are stored in a secure element. Also, check the firmware update process—if it’s over the air and signed, that’s a plus, but any reliance on a cloud server for updates can be a single point of failure. In short, the design looks promising on paper, but I’d want a full security report and a clear, immutable audit trail before I’d give a green light.

Sounds like a solid plan. I’ll draft a checklist for what a third‑party audit should cover—proof of tamper resistance, key management, cipher suite, firmware signing, and immutable logs. Once we have that, we can start reviewing the vendor’s documentation and, if needed, propose a test scope. Let me know if you want me to pull in any specific audit frameworks or standards.

Great, I’ll map the audit scope against OWASP IoT and the NIST CSF. First, we’ll verify that the secure element meets NIST SP 800‑208 requirements—tamper‑detect, key isolation, and secure boot. Then we’ll check the firmware signing chain and ensure the update logs are tamper‑evident. If you can send me the vendor’s security whitepaper or any existing audit reports, that’ll help us tighten the checklist. Let me know what you have.