Jameson & Deus
Deus Deus
Saw the latest breach in the cloud storage of that big retailer, and I kept a color‑coded log of every failed exploit. Any interest in how the data actually slipped out?
Jameson Jameson
Sure, lay it out. What did the color codes tell you about the attack chain? Did you see a pattern that points to a specific vulnerability or insider help? Any clue on who’s behind the breach? That’s what I need to dig into.
Deus Deus
Red: credential stuffing at login, green: lateral jump through an open RDP session, blue: data exfil over an unencrypted FTP channel. Pattern: first a low‑effort brute force, then a pivot through a mis‑configured service, then stealthy file dump. Looks like the classic “forgot to revoke IAM roles” flaw, not a zero‑day. No sign of insider code—just a rogue admin account that was never disabled. Whoever pulled it off is probably someone with internal access and a lot of patience, but I’ve got no name yet.
Jameson Jameson
That sounds like a textbook case of sloppy privilege management. If the admin account never got revoked, whoever’s behind it could have sat on it for months, gathering creds, waiting for a weak password. The fact that the exfil went through plain FTP means they were willing to leave a clear trace; maybe they didn’t expect anyone to notice. Have you cross‑checked the account’s activity logs—login times, IP addresses, any other services accessed? Those details could point to a real person or at least narrow it down to a specific workstation. Also, check whether any other accounts were created or elevated around the same time; sometimes a rogue admin will spin up a backdoor. If you can pull the exact timestamps, we might be able to tie it to a shift pattern or a contractor’s schedule. Let me know what you find, and we can see if the trail leads to a name.
Deus Deus
Checked the logs – the admin account logged in 23:17 UTC from a VPN node that only connects during the night shift, then at 23:43 it opened the RDP session to the DMZ server, and 00:12 the FTP upload started. The IP matches a corporate gateway – no external jump. No other account elevations, no new users created. The timestamps line up with the night‑shift roster: the VPN credentials were only issued to the security analyst on call. That’s the only link I see so far.
Jameson Jameson
Sounds like the night‑shift analyst is the only one with those VPN creds, so that’s the suspect. Check the analyst’s work log, see if they had any reason to touch the admin account—maybe a support ticket, a tool install, or a recent audit. If nothing jumps out, you’ll need to trace the RDP session: look at the source machine, the process that launched the RDP client, and any scripts that ran. It could be an automated tool they set up or a manual move. If you can’t find a legitimate reason, the evidence points to misuse of a legitimate credential. That’s the angle you’ll want to pull in.
Deus Deus
Tried pulling the analyst’s shift log—no tickets, no maintenance notes, nothing that would justify opening the admin box. The RDP session shows it launched from a workstation that only boots at 23:10, and the process was “mstsc.exe” with a command line that had a hidden PowerShell script attached. No scheduled task, no automation, just a manual launch. Looks like someone used the night‑shift VPN creds to slip in, hijack the admin account, then dump the data. That’s the trail I’m seeing.