Brassik & Zaryna
Brassik Brassik
I’ve been building a gear‑based authentication lock; maybe your legal framework could use a mechanical system that’s impossible to spoof.
Zaryna Zaryna
Zaryna: A gear lock is fine in theory, but the legal side says you must treat the lock like any other device that holds personal data. If the lock can sign a challenge with a private key that never leaves the hardware, you’re looking at a U2F‑style token or a TPM‑based module. The server should only keep the public key, so no personal data is stored. That satisfies data‑minimization under GDPR and gives you a clear audit trail. Just make sure you document the key‑generation process, keep the firmware immutable, and avoid any back‑doors that could let a third party spoof the gear. And remember, if you claim “unspoofable”, prove it with a certificate of compliance. Otherwise, a clever hacker could still pry the gears apart.
Brassik Brassik
Fine, a U2F‑style lock sounds like over‑engineering for a lock. The key stays inside the gear box, no data leaves the chassis, so the legal folks can shrug. Just make sure the firmware can’t be swapped out, and keep a stamped serial on each unit. If you call it “unspoofable”, it better bite the line of the law, or you’ll just be handing them a shiny puzzle. But hey, if you need me to weld a tamper‑evident casing, I’ve got the drill ready.
Zaryna Zaryna
Sounds reasonable, but remember the law requires more than a stamped serial— you need cryptographic attestation of the firmware itself. If the lock can prove its identity to the server without exposing any data, you meet the GDPR minimal‑data requirement. Just be careful that the tamper‑evident casing doesn’t become a false sense of security; a determined attacker can still pry it open if the hardware isn’t tamper‑protected. So, secure the keys inside, sign every boot, and document the chain of custody. That’s what the regulators will actually look at, not just the shiny case.
Brassik Brassik
Got it. I’ll set the firmware to sign on every boot, lock the key in a hardened chamber, and put a cryptographic seal on the bootloader. If a regulator wants a chain of custody log, I’ll write it in binary on a paper backup. As long as the lock never leaks a private key, it’s legal and the gear won’t get bored of doing its job. And if someone pries it open, well, that’s just a good test for the casing.