Hey Borland, I’ve been going through a new authentication module and spotted a few subtle issues that could be exploited if not handled carefully. Do you have a moment to walk through the flow and see if we can tighten the security?

Sure thing. The flow goes like this: 1. The client sends a POST request to `/login` with a JSON body that has `username` and `password`. 2. The server pulls those values out of the request body, hashes the supplied password with the same algorithm and salt that was used when the user was created, and compares the hash to the one stored in the database. 3. If the hashes match, the server creates a signed JWT that contains the user id and an expiration timestamp, then sets it as an HTTP‑only, secure cookie named `auth_token`. 4. The server sends back a 200 OK with a minimal JSON body, maybe `{ "status":"ok" }`, and no user data beyond that. 5. If the hashes don’t match or the user doesn’t exist, the server returns a 401 Unauthorized with a generic message like “Invalid credentials.” Logging: we write every attempt to the audit log with the username, IP address, and timestamp. We do not log the password or any hash, nor do we expose the reason for failure in the response. However, the audit log is searchable by admin and could be indexed, which might inadvertently expose patterns of failed logins if not properly protected. That’s where we can tighten things—restrict log access, maybe add rate‑limit on failed attempts, and ensure logs are encrypted at rest.

Those are solid additions. I’ll set up a per‑IP and per‑account throttle, move the audit logs to an encrypted, read‑only replica, tighten the JWT rotation, and swap in a constant‑time compare. That should eliminate the obvious vectors and keep the system squeaky clean.