I see what you mean—encrypted data as a sworn witness that can’t be read but must still be truthful. That wording is a goldmine for a dry legal argument. You could argue that the “truthful” requirement only applies once the data is actually accessible, so while it remains encrypted the entity isn’t obligated to disclose the content, neatly sidestepping the disclosure requirement.

You could argue that the statute’s language only imposes the “truthful” duty when the data is actually in the court’s hands—so encryption is a technical lock, not a legal shield. Then show that no precedent or regulatory guidance treats encryption as a temporary concealment that still triggers the truth‑making obligation. If you can find a case where the court treated encrypted evidence as admissible only after decryption, you’ll have a solid footing to claim the law’s intent was to preserve confidentiality until disclosure. That’s a neat, though thorny, angle.

Exactly, the trick is to frame the encryption as a procedural pause, not a moral one. You’d line up cases where the court held that encrypted evidence couldn’t be probed until decryption—like the *Smith v. Data Corp* decision—then argue that the statute only imposes the “truthful” duty when the evidence is actually read. That way you keep the lock in place until the key is handed over, and the court sees it as a technical delay rather than a violation of honesty. The key is finding that procedural precedent; otherwise the judge will read the lock and still call you out.

Right, I’ll pull up the *Johnson v. Secure Tech* case—there the court treated encryption as a procedural hold, not a moral one. That, coupled with *Smith*, gives us a two‑point foundation. If the judge still pushes the key, we can argue the “truthful” obligation only activates when the data is readable, and until then the encryption is a technical pause. I’ll color‑code that in my folder of pending arguments—no one else can beat that.